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According to Aca-Europe the case referes to secondary movement of an alleged Eritrean applicant who was previously granted refugee status in Italy, being issued a residence permit and travel documents. 

"In 2011, he applied for recognition as a person entitled to political asylum in Germany. In 2013, the Italian Ministry of the Interior informed the Federal Police Headquarters of his readmission readiness. With decision of February 2013, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees ascertained that the plaintiff was not entitled to asylum because of his entry from a safe third country and ordered his deportation to Italy. The lawsuit was unsuccessful in the lower courts as far as the third country decision was concerned. The Higher Administrative Court has justified this with the fact that the plaintiff is not entitled to asylum, since he entered the country from a safe third country. The applicant had not invalidated the presumption of safety in the third country. In particular, in the case of deportation to Italy, there was no risk of treatment which would contradict Article 3 of the ECHR. The plaintiff's appeal is directed against this. According to the case law of the Senate, the inadmissibility of an asylum application governed in accordance with the prevailing legal basis in § 29, paragraph 1, No. 3 of the AsylG (Asylum Act), cannot constitute a legal basis for the contested decision because of the entry from a safe third country. The success of the appeal depends on whether the decision of inadmissibility can be reinterpreted as one pursuant to § 29, paragraph 1, No. 2 of the AsylG. It states that an asylum application is inadmissible if another EU member state has already granted international protection. In this case of a foreign refugee recognition, Article 25, paragraph 2, point a of Directive 2005/85/EC already authorised such a regulation. However, the Senate sees a need for clarification as to whether a decision of inadmissibility may also be taken if the living conditions for recognised refugees in the other member state do not meet the requirements of Articles 20 et seq. of Directive 2011/95/EU without violating Article 3 of the ECHR. The Senate also sees a need for clarification of the legal consequences of a hearing that was omitted in the administrative proceedings if, as was the case with the inadmissibility decision, it concerns a bound decision. The questions submitted are as follows: 1. Is a member state (here: Germany) prevented under the EU law from applying for international protection on the grounds of a refugee status in another member state (here: Italy) in the implementation of the authorisation in Article 33, paragraph 2, point a of Directive 2013/32/EU and/or of the previous provision in Article 25, paragraph 2, point a of Directive 2005/85/EC, if the arrangement of international protection, namely the living conditions for recognised refugees, in the other member state that has already granted international protection to the applicant (here: Italy), does not meet the requirements of Articles 20 et seq. of Directive 2011/95/EU without violating Article 4 of the GRC and/or Article 3 of the ECHR?

2. If question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: Does this also apply if recognised refugees in the member state that recognises the refugee (here: Italy) a) are granted no benefits, or benefits only to a very limited extent compared with other member states, provided that they are not treated differently from nationals of that member state? b) are granted rights under Article 20 et. seq. Directive 2011/95/EU, but have de facto more difficult access to the associated services, or have such services of family or civil society networks that replace or supplement state services? 3. Does Article 14, paragraph 1, sentence 1 of Directive 2013/32/EU or the previous provision in Article 12, paragraph 1, sentence 1 of Directive 2005/85/EC oppose the application of a national provision, according to which an omitted personal hearing of the applicant for the rejection of the asylum application deemed as inadmissible by the asylum authority when implementing the authorisation in Article 33, paragraph 2, point a of Directive 2013/32/EU or the previous provision in Article 25, paragraph 2, point a of Directive 2005/85/EC, does not lead to the annulment of this decision for lack of hearing if the applicant has the opportunity to present all the circumstances, which speak against an inadmissibility decision, in the appeal procedure and if, even taking this submission into account, no other decision can be taken on the merits?

The CJEU judgement was pronounced in the case Milkiyas Addis (Eritrea) on 16 July 2020.

Following the CJEU judgement, the Federal Administrative Court reopened the case and adopted a judgement on 30 March 2021.

The applicants, Kazakh nationals, submitted a request for international protection on grounds of being targeted by the authorities because of their Christian faith and of the husband’s role as a representative of the church. The City Court rejected their application, holding that restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion imposed by Kazakh legislation do not in themselves constitute grounds for granting international protection and are not sufficient to be regarded as persecution or serious harm, as it was found in the present case. The applicants appealed the decision on grounds that the Court had failed to consider sufficient evidence and relevant reports and country of origin information documenting the persecution of Christians in Kazakhstan. Additionally, the Court did not address the fact that the applicants would be at risk of persecution upon return because they had lodged an application for international protection abroad.

The Supreme Administrative Court considered country of origin information on Kazakhstan and found that the evidence points to persecution against representatives of Christian churches. It therefore ruled that the City Court did not sufficiently assess the situation of the applicant and the impact on the whole family and their grounds for applying for international protection. The Supreme Administrative Court annulled the decision of the City Court and referred the case back for further assessment.

The case concerned an appeal lodged by a Congolese national against a decision of inadmissibility of a subsequent application for international protection, taken by the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons. In the first request for international protection the applicant alleged a fear of persecution by the former rebel group Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (‘RCD’), on account of his links with Z. M., a dissident from that movement having fled to Europe. The applicant stated that he had been kidnapped by the RCD in 1999 and was imprisoned in the central prison of Goma from which he had finally managed to evade himself. The CGRS rejected the request stating that there was no indication that the applicant could not settle in Kinshasa without encountering any problems there and, second, that he did not adduce any evidence to establish that he was in fact being sought. In the second application, lodged on 10 September 2019, the applicant relied on the same grounds of fear as those put forward at the time of his first application and stated that he was still sought by the RCD and was prohibited from entering Congolese territory. In addition, he also claimed that he feared a return to the Congo, having learned that his father was murdered in 2008 by the Congolese Armed Forces because he had a dispensary in Eastern Congo where Rwandans had received treatment. He also referred to the security situation in the province of North Kivu and he stated that he sufferred from serious health problems and invoked the lack of appropriate medical care in the DRC.

On appeal, the Council for Alien Law Litigation confirmed the rejection of the subsequent application, holding that the applicant had indeed not presented any new element or new fact.

With regard to indiscriminate violence, the Council held that it is only in relation to the city of Goma that the Council examines, in this case, whether the conditions are met and noted that the situation prevailing in the city of Goma must be distinguished from that in several areas of North Kivu, which are experiencing severe chronic insecurity due to armed clashes involving numerous rebel groups and the Congolese Armed Forces. The Council observed that the acts of violence have decreased in number and are more the consequence of banditry rather than of the armed conflict in the region. It concluded that the city of Goma is not experiencing indiscriminate violence.

As regards the applicant's health problems, the Cuncil held that neither the CGRS nor the Council have the legal competence to examine an application for granting subsidiary protection based on purely medical grounds.

The Court of Cassation decided on the appeal lodged by the Ministry of the Interior against a decision issued by the Court of Appeal of Milan by which the applicant, a Pakistani national, was granted a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. The Court of Appeal had held that the repatriation to the country of origin would result in the loss of ‘ethically and legally appreciable opportunities’ given the person's integration 'in the social and economic fabric of the host country' by following professional training and finding a fixed employment.

With regard to humanitarian protection, the Court of Cassation held that for the purposes of recognition of humanitarian protection, a comparative assessment of the individual and objective situation of the applicant must be carried out by reference to the country of origin, compared with the integration situation reached in the host country, without considering the level of integration in isolation. This comparative assessment must be carried out by attributing to the subjective and objective conditions of the applicant in the country of origin the greater the degree of integration which the applicant proves to have achieved in the Italian social fabric. The court noted that particularly serious human rights deprivation situations in the country of origin may establish an applicant’s right to humanitarian protection even in the absence of an appreciable degree of integration into Italy. The court pointed that social integration is not a sine qua non of humanitarian protection, but one of the possible facts constituting the right to such protection, to be assessed in comparison with the objective and subjective situation which the applicant would find when returning to his country of origin.

The court also held that where there is a high level of effective integration in Italy, which can be deduced from socially relevant indicators (fixed-term contracts, tenancy relationship, the presence of children attending kindergartens or schools, participation in associative activities), the objective and subjective conditions in the country of origin will be the least important.

Thus, if the return to the country of origin makes it probable that the conditions of private and/or family life will be significantly eroded in such a way as to infringe the right recognised by Article 8 of the ECHR, there is a serious humanitarian ground for the recognition of a residence permit.

In this case, the appeal brought by the Ministry of the Interior was rejected.

The Finnish Immigration Service appealed against an administrative court decision to lift the entry ban concerning an Iraqi national that was considered by the FIS a dander to the public order and security, and for whom the FIS decided that voluntary return cannot be applied in light of the criminal offences committed by the applicant.

The Supreme Administrative Court held that a case-by-case analysis shall be conducted when considering whether a person constitutes a danger to public order and security and for this purpose the court must assess if the threat to the fundamental interests of society is real, immediate, and sufficiently serious. A person suspected for having committed a criminal offence or who was convicted for an act, can not be regarded as a danger to public security unless other circumstances are balanced, such as the nature and gravity of the act alongside with the time elapsed since the act. A decision must indicate explanations on the suspected crime and how it relates to the general assessment.

The FIS made the decision to impose an entry ban on the applicant when the later was suspected of aggravated assault committed in April 2018, based on the act that assault offences affect the life and health of others and concluded that the applicant endangered public order and security. The Administrative Court overturned the decision and lifted the entry ban based on the fact that the applicant was convicted for assault.

The Supreme administrative Court found that the FIS, in its initial decision did not specify the report on the suspected offence on which it based the assessment of the endangerment of the public order and security.

The Supreme Administrative Court mentioned that the assessment shall take into consideration the person’s behaviour in the future, thus the analysis of the risk is not limited to the time when the matter was decided by the FIS but new facts raised after the FIS and the administrative decisions have to be examined.  Such new facts may have a significant impact by eliminating or decisively reducing the risk to public order and security posed by a person or it can increase the risk, and consequently impacting the assessment made by the FIS.

In its appeal, the FIS presented a new report that the applicant he is suspected of extortion and stalking, as well as unlawful threat and assault. The Supreme Administrative Court took into account the new report as part of the overall assessment of the danger to public order and security, even though the new facts had come to light after the decision of the Finnish Immigration Service. The fact that the applicant was convicted for assault and is suspected of other offenses was considered by the Supreme Administrative Court as proofs that the applicant poses a danger and a threat to public security and order, annulled the administrative court decision and imposed an entry ban as provided by the initial FIS decision.

The Supreme Administrative Court annulled the Administrative Court's decision on the lifting of the entry ban and the imposition of a voluntary return period and imposed an entry ban imposed by the Finnish Immigration Service.