According to Aca-Europe the case referes to secondary movement of an alleged Eritrean applicant who was previously granted refugee status in Italy, being issued a residence permit and travel documents. 

"In 2011, he applied for recognition as a person entitled to political asylum in Germany. In 2013, the Italian Ministry of the Interior informed the Federal Police Headquarters of his readmission readiness. With decision of February 2013, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees ascertained that the plaintiff was not entitled to asylum because of his entry from a safe third country and ordered his deportation to Italy. The lawsuit was unsuccessful in the lower courts as far as the third country decision was concerned. The Higher Administrative Court has justified this with the fact that the plaintiff is not entitled to asylum, since he entered the country from a safe third country. The applicant had not invalidated the presumption of safety in the third country. In particular, in the case of deportation to Italy, there was no risk of treatment which would contradict Article 3 of the ECHR. The plaintiff's appeal is directed against this. According to the case law of the Senate, the inadmissibility of an asylum application governed in accordance with the prevailing legal basis in § 29, paragraph 1, No. 3 of the AsylG (Asylum Act), cannot constitute a legal basis for the contested decision because of the entry from a safe third country. The success of the appeal depends on whether the decision of inadmissibility can be reinterpreted as one pursuant to § 29, paragraph 1, No. 2 of the AsylG. It states that an asylum application is inadmissible if another EU member state has already granted international protection. In this case of a foreign refugee recognition, Article 25, paragraph 2, point a of Directive 2005/85/EC already authorised such a regulation. However, the Senate sees a need for clarification as to whether a decision of inadmissibility may also be taken if the living conditions for recognised refugees in the other member state do not meet the requirements of Articles 20 et seq. of Directive 2011/95/EU without violating Article 3 of the ECHR. The Senate also sees a need for clarification of the legal consequences of a hearing that was omitted in the administrative proceedings if, as was the case with the inadmissibility decision, it concerns a bound decision. The questions submitted are as follows: 1. Is a member state (here: Germany) prevented under the EU law from applying for international protection on the grounds of a refugee status in another member state (here: Italy) in the implementation of the authorisation in Article 33, paragraph 2, point a of Directive 2013/32/EU and/or of the previous provision in Article 25, paragraph 2, point a of Directive 2005/85/EC, if the arrangement of international protection, namely the living conditions for recognised refugees, in the other member state that has already granted international protection to the applicant (here: Italy), does not meet the requirements of Articles 20 et seq. of Directive 2011/95/EU without violating Article 4 of the GRC and/or Article 3 of the ECHR?

2. If question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: Does this also apply if recognised refugees in the member state that recognises the refugee (here: Italy) a) are granted no benefits, or benefits only to a very limited extent compared with other member states, provided that they are not treated differently from nationals of that member state? b) are granted rights under Article 20 et. seq. Directive 2011/95/EU, but have de facto more difficult access to the associated services, or have such services of family or civil society networks that replace or supplement state services? 3. Does Article 14, paragraph 1, sentence 1 of Directive 2013/32/EU or the previous provision in Article 12, paragraph 1, sentence 1 of Directive 2005/85/EC oppose the application of a national provision, according to which an omitted personal hearing of the applicant for the rejection of the asylum application deemed as inadmissible by the asylum authority when implementing the authorisation in Article 33, paragraph 2, point a of Directive 2013/32/EU or the previous provision in Article 25, paragraph 2, point a of Directive 2005/85/EC, does not lead to the annulment of this decision for lack of hearing if the applicant has the opportunity to present all the circumstances, which speak against an inadmissibility decision, in the appeal procedure and if, even taking this submission into account, no other decision can be taken on the merits?

The CJEU judgement was pronounced in the case Milkiyas Addis (Eritrea) on 16 July 2020.

Following the CJEU judgement, the Federal Administrative Court reopened the case and adopted a judgement on 30 March 2021.

The case concerned two applicants from Somalia, who arrived to Malta after being rescued from a boat crossing from Libya on 1 October 2004. On arrival, they were identified by the police. They were not given the opportunity to apply for international protection, and after ten days they were taken by the police to be returned to Lybia. They were not given the possibility to speak with a UNHCR representative in Malta despite their request. The police forced them to take the airplane back to Libya, where they claim that they were arrested by Libyan authorities and interrogated, beaten and tortured. In November 2005 they were left in the desert and spent 14 days there without food or water. The two applicants managed to return to Tripoli and on 23 June 2006 they once again reached Malta. In Malta, they claimed to the First Hall Civil Court that the facts they were subject to give rise to an infringement of Article 3 and Article 13 of the ECHR, Article 36 of the Constitution of Malta, Article 4 of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR and requesting to receive appropriate remedies for the violation of their fundamental rights.

The First Hall Civil Court considered that the applicants were exposed to torture and inhumane or degrading treatment upon their return to Libya, and therefore there was a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. The Ministry for Justice and the Interior and the Police Commissioner in his capacity as Principal Immigration Officer appealed this decision on grounds that the Court made an inaccurate assessment of the evidence regarding the treatment that the claimants received in Libya.

The Constitutional Court noted that, if the removal of a person gives rise to an infringement of Article 3 of the ECHR as there are substantial grounds to believe that that person would risk being subject to torture or inhumane and degrading treatment, there is an obligation not to remove the person. In this case, the Court considers that with regards to the first applicant, his testimony can be considered credible with regards to the treatment he received in Libya and it cannot be challenged at this stage as no other evidence, such as medical records, was previously requested by the appellant. This is not applicable to the other applicant as there is no testimony from his part and therefore no evidence to assess the treatment he received in Libya.

Considering the documents used to assess the situation in Libya at the time of removal, the Court ruled that the Maltese government ought to have known that the migrants were the risk of being tortured or treated inhumanely or degrading. The Court also ruled that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR and of Article 36 of the Constitution on the part of the two applicants, within the limits of the fact that it was proven that the first applicant was subject to torture and inhumane and degrading treatment, while this was not proved for the second applicant.  Additionally, the Court ruled that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the ECHR with regards to the first applicant.

The applicants, Kazakh nationals, submitted a request for international protection on grounds of being targeted by the authorities because of their Christian faith and of the husband’s role as a representative of the church. The City Court rejected their application, holding that restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion imposed by Kazakh legislation do not in themselves constitute grounds for granting international protection and are not sufficient to be regarded as persecution or serious harm, as it was found in the present case. The applicants appealed the decision on grounds that the Court had failed to consider sufficient evidence and relevant reports and country of origin information documenting the persecution of Christians in Kazakhstan. Additionally, the Court did not address the fact that the applicants would be at risk of persecution upon return because they had lodged an application for international protection abroad.

The Supreme Administrative Court considered country of origin information on Kazakhstan and found that the evidence points to persecution against representatives of Christian churches. It therefore ruled that the City Court did not sufficiently assess the situation of the applicant and the impact on the whole family and their grounds for applying for international protection. The Supreme Administrative Court annulled the decision of the City Court and referred the case back for further assessment.